Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power / Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Material type: TextPublication details: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.Description: 1 online resourceContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781139003964
- 1139003968
- 9781107341531
- 1107341531
- 9781107347786
- 1107347785
- 9781107234901
- 1107234905
- 9781107347779
- 1107347777
- 1107357403
- 9781107357402
- 1107348897
- 9781107348899
- 1107344034
- 9781107344037
- 9781107459434
- 1107459435
- Corporate governance -- Law and legislation
- Common law
- Stockholders -- Legal status, laws, etc
- Common law
- LAW -- Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice
- Gouvernance d'entreprise
- Jurisprudence
- Droit des sociétés
- Droit des affaires
- Actionnaires
- Sociétés anonymes
- Common law
- Corporate governance -- Law and legislation
- Stockholders -- Legal status, laws, etc
- Law
- 346/.0666 23
- K1327 .B78 2013eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes index.
List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; Part I Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World; 1 Introduction and Overview; 2 Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance; A. Functionalism and Contextualism; B. Failing Better; 3 The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions; A. The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Stewards; II. Enlightened Shareholder Value; III. Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance; B. The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Spectators.
II. Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder InterestsIII. Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance; C. Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance; Part II A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 4 Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance; A. Economics; B. Politics; I. "Law Matters"; II. Social Democracy; III. Institutions; IV. "Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities; V. Coalitions; VI. Political Parties and Political Salience.
VII. Extra-Corporate Stakeholder ProtectionsC. Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 5 Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy; A. The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy; B. The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy; C. Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium; Part III The Theory's Explanatory Domain; 6 Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; A. Mapping the Explanatory Domain.
B. The Evolving Shareholder BaseC. Postcrisis Austerity; D. Postcrisis Coalitions; 7 Conclusions; Index.
Presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Print version record.
Includes bibliographical references (pages xi-xiii) and index.
English.
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