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Corporate governance in the common-law world : the political foundations of shareholder power / Christopher M. Bruner, Washington and Lee University School of Law.

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781139003964
  • 1139003968
  • 9781107341531
  • 1107341531
  • 9781107347786
  • 1107347785
  • 9781107234901
  • 1107234905
  • 9781107347779
  • 1107347777
  • 1107357403
  • 9781107357402
  • 1107348897
  • 9781107348899
  • 1107344034
  • 9781107344037
  • 9781107459434
  • 1107459435
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: No titleDDC classification:
  • 346/.0666 23
LOC classification:
  • K1327 .B78 2013eb
Online resources:
Contents:
List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; Part I Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World; 1 Introduction and Overview; 2 Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance; A. Functionalism and Contextualism; B. Failing Better; 3 The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions; A. The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Stewards; II. Enlightened Shareholder Value; III. Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance; B. The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Spectators.
II. Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder InterestsIII. Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance; C. Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance; Part II A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 4 Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance; A. Economics; B. Politics; I. "Law Matters"; II. Social Democracy; III. Institutions; IV. "Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities; V. Coalitions; VI. Political Parties and Political Salience.
VII. Extra-Corporate Stakeholder ProtectionsC. Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 5 Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy; A. The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy; B. The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy; C. Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium; Part III The Theory's Explanatory Domain; 6 Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; A. Mapping the Explanatory Domain.
B. The Evolving Shareholder BaseC. Postcrisis Austerity; D. Postcrisis Coalitions; 7 Conclusions; Index.
Summary: Presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Includes index.

List of Figures; Acknowledgments; Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; Part I Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World; 1 Introduction and Overview; 2 Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance; A. Functionalism and Contextualism; B. Failing Better; 3 The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions; A. The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Stewards; II. Enlightened Shareholder Value; III. Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance; B. The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders; I. Shareholders as Spectators.

II. Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder InterestsIII. Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance; C. Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance; Part II A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 4 Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance; A. Economics; B. Politics; I. "Law Matters"; II. Social Democracy; III. Institutions; IV. "Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities; V. Coalitions; VI. Political Parties and Political Salience.

VII. Extra-Corporate Stakeholder ProtectionsC. Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; 5 Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy; A. The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy; B. The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy; C. Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model; I. Australia; II. Canada; D. Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium; Part III The Theory's Explanatory Domain; 6 Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World; A. Mapping the Explanatory Domain.

B. The Evolving Shareholder BaseC. Postcrisis Austerity; D. Postcrisis Coalitions; 7 Conclusions; Index.

Presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Print version record.

Includes bibliographical references (pages xi-xiii) and index.

English.

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