The vulnerability thesis : interest group influence and institutional design / Lorelei K. Moosbrugger.

By:

Moosbrugger, Lorelei K [author.]

Material type: Text

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780300167580
030016758X

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Vulnerability thesis.DDC classification:

322.4/3 23

LOC classification:

JF529 .M66 2012eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Interest group influence and institutional design -- The vulnerability thesis -- Evidence from the environment -- The European Union -- The United Kingdom: minority influence and majority rule -- Germany: the politics of paying the polluter -- Austria: political cover and policy choice -- Sweden: minority representation and the majority interest -- Institutional design and the quality of democracy.

Summary: Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 169-183) and index.

Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.

Print version record.

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