Unanswered threats : political constraints on the balance of power /
Schweller, Randall L.
Unanswered threats : political constraints on the balance of power / Randall L. Schweller. - Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, 2008. - 1 online resource (182 pages) : illustrations - - Princeton studies in international history and politics . - Princeton studies in international history and politics. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 153-164) and index.
Balance of power and the puzzle of underbalancing behavior -- Prudence in managing changes in the balance of power -- A theory of underbalancing : a neoclassical realist explanation -- Great-power case studies : interwar France and Britain, and France, 1877-1913 -- Small-power case studies : Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and the War of the Triple Alliance, 1864-1870 -- Why are states so timid? State coherence and expansion in the age of mass politics.
Why have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, "Unanswered Threats" offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations
9781400837854 (electronic bk.) 1400837855 (electronic bk.) 9780691124254 0691124256
9780691124254
22573/ctt10nj9 JSTOR
GBA604291 bnb
013354638 Uk
Balance of power--History.
Balance of power--Case studies.
Équilibre des puissances--Histoire.
Équilibre des puissances--Études de cas.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Globalization.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--International Relations--Diplomacy.
Balance of power.
Sicherheitspolitik
Gleichgewichtspolitik
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
History.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Études de cas.
JZ1313 / .S39 2008eb
327.112
Unanswered threats : political constraints on the balance of power / Randall L. Schweller. - Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, 2008. - 1 online resource (182 pages) : illustrations - - Princeton studies in international history and politics . - Princeton studies in international history and politics. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 153-164) and index.
Balance of power and the puzzle of underbalancing behavior -- Prudence in managing changes in the balance of power -- A theory of underbalancing : a neoclassical realist explanation -- Great-power case studies : interwar France and Britain, and France, 1877-1913 -- Small-power case studies : Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and the War of the Triple Alliance, 1864-1870 -- Why are states so timid? State coherence and expansion in the age of mass politics.
Why have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, "Unanswered Threats" offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations
9781400837854 (electronic bk.) 1400837855 (electronic bk.) 9780691124254 0691124256
9780691124254
22573/ctt10nj9 JSTOR
GBA604291 bnb
013354638 Uk
Balance of power--History.
Balance of power--Case studies.
Équilibre des puissances--Histoire.
Équilibre des puissances--Études de cas.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Globalization.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--International Relations--Diplomacy.
Balance of power.
Sicherheitspolitik
Gleichgewichtspolitik
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
History.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Études de cas.
JZ1313 / .S39 2008eb
327.112