Lessons unlearned : the U.S. Army's role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq /
Proctor, Pat, 1971-
Lessons unlearned : the U.S. Army's role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq / United States Army's role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Pat Proctor. - 1 online resource (xv, 486 pages) - The American military experience series . - American military experience series. .
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Phoenix or Icarus? -- Somalia, Haiti, and Force XXI -- Bosnia and the Army after Next -- Kosovo, the War on Terror, and the Interim Force -- "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement ..."
"Pat Proctor has written an important, long overdue, critique of the Army's preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era. As a soldier-scholar, his book contributes an original argument on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies, or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Colonel Proctor reveals that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to this new strategic reality, leaving it largely unprepared when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began. This is the first study to connect the failures of these wars to America's disastrous performance in the war on terror. Moreover, this book is not just an esoteric history; the U.S. Army is marching headlong toward repeating the same mistakes. This book serves as an "intervention," an attempt to convince Army leaders to change what Colonel Proctor contends is a disastrous course"--
0826274374 (electronic book) 9780826274373 (electronic bk.) (hardcover)
2019034809
United States. Army --Organization--Evaluation.
United States. Army --Operational readiness--Evaluation.
États-Unis. Army --État de préparation opérationnelle--Évaluation.
United States. Army.
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)--United States.
Intervention (International law)--Case studies.
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)--Case studies.
Military doctrine--United States.
Strategy.
Conflits de basse intensité--États-Unis.
Intervention (Droit international)--Études de cas.
Conflits de basse intensité--Études de cas.
Doctrines militaires--États-Unis.
Stratégie.
Intervention (International law)
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)
Military doctrine.
Strategy.
United States--History, Military--Case studies.
États-Unis--Histoire militaire--Études de cas.
United States.
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Military history.
U240 / .P765 2020
355.02/180973
Lessons unlearned : the U.S. Army's role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq / United States Army's role in creating the forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Pat Proctor. - 1 online resource (xv, 486 pages) - The American military experience series . - American military experience series. .
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Phoenix or Icarus? -- Somalia, Haiti, and Force XXI -- Bosnia and the Army after Next -- Kosovo, the War on Terror, and the Interim Force -- "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement ..."
"Pat Proctor has written an important, long overdue, critique of the Army's preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era. As a soldier-scholar, his book contributes an original argument on a national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies, or can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of counterinsurgent and information age warfare? In this blunt critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Colonel Proctor reveals that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to this new strategic reality, leaving it largely unprepared when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began. This is the first study to connect the failures of these wars to America's disastrous performance in the war on terror. Moreover, this book is not just an esoteric history; the U.S. Army is marching headlong toward repeating the same mistakes. This book serves as an "intervention," an attempt to convince Army leaders to change what Colonel Proctor contends is a disastrous course"--
0826274374 (electronic book) 9780826274373 (electronic bk.) (hardcover)
2019034809
United States. Army --Organization--Evaluation.
United States. Army --Operational readiness--Evaluation.
États-Unis. Army --État de préparation opérationnelle--Évaluation.
United States. Army.
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)--United States.
Intervention (International law)--Case studies.
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)--Case studies.
Military doctrine--United States.
Strategy.
Conflits de basse intensité--États-Unis.
Intervention (Droit international)--Études de cas.
Conflits de basse intensité--Études de cas.
Doctrines militaires--États-Unis.
Stratégie.
Intervention (International law)
Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)
Military doctrine.
Strategy.
United States--History, Military--Case studies.
États-Unis--Histoire militaire--Études de cas.
United States.
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
Case studies.
Military history.
U240 / .P765 2020
355.02/180973