State building and late development /
Waldner, David.
State building and late development / David Waldner. - 1 online resource (x, 246 pages) : illustrations
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Institutional Origins and Economic Outcomes -- 2. State Building and the Origins of Institutional Profiles -- 3. Constructing Coalitions and Building States: Turkey -- 4. Constructing Coalitions and Building States: Syria -- 5. Precocious Keynesianism in Practice -- 6. Elite Cohesion and State Building in East Asia -- 7. The Collective Dilemmas of Late Development -- 8. The Developmental Consequences of Precocious Keynesianism -- 9. Pathways from Precocious Keynesianism -- 10. Theory and Method Reconsidered.
Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? Through an analysis of political and economic development in four countries-Turkey, Syria, Korea, and Taiwan-this book explores the origins of political-economic institutions and the mechanisms connecting them to economic outcomes. David Waldner extends our understanding of the political underpinnings of economic development by examining the origins of political coalitions on which states and their institutions depend. He first provides a political model of institutional change to analyze how elites build either cross-class or narrow coalitions, and he examines how these arrangements shape specific institutions: state-society relations, the nature of bureaucracy, fiscal structures, and patterns of economic intervention. He then links these institutions to economic outcomes through a bargaining model to explain why countries such as Korea and Taiwan have more effectively overcome the collective dilemmas that plague economic development than have others such as Turkey and Syria. The latter countries, he shows, lack institutional solutions to the problems that surround productivity growth. The first book to compare political and economic development in these two regions, State Building and Late Development draws on, and contributes to, arguments from political sociology and political economy. Based on a rigorous research design, the work offers both a finely drawn comparison of development and a compellingly argued analysis of the character and consequences of "precocious Keynesianism," the implementation of Keynesian demand-stimulus policies in largely pre-industrial economies
9781501717338 (electronic bk.) 1501717332 (electronic bk.)
22573/ctv1krvrz JSTOR
State, The.
État.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Political Economy.
Politics and government
State, The.
Politik
Staatsvorming.
Syria--Politics and government.
Turkey--Politics and government.
Korea--Politics and government.
Taiwan--Politics and government.
Syrie--Politique et gouvernement.
Turquie--Politique et gouvernement.
Corée--Politique et gouvernement.
Taiwan--Politique et gouvernement.
Empire ottoman--Politique et gouvernement.
Korea.
Syria.
Taiwan.
Turkey.
Syrien
Türkei
Taiwan
Korea
Electronic books.
JC131 / .W36 1999eb
321/.09172/40904
State building and late development / David Waldner. - 1 online resource (x, 246 pages) : illustrations
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Institutional Origins and Economic Outcomes -- 2. State Building and the Origins of Institutional Profiles -- 3. Constructing Coalitions and Building States: Turkey -- 4. Constructing Coalitions and Building States: Syria -- 5. Precocious Keynesianism in Practice -- 6. Elite Cohesion and State Building in East Asia -- 7. The Collective Dilemmas of Late Development -- 8. The Developmental Consequences of Precocious Keynesianism -- 9. Pathways from Precocious Keynesianism -- 10. Theory and Method Reconsidered.
Why does state building sometimes promote economic growth and in other cases impede it? Through an analysis of political and economic development in four countries-Turkey, Syria, Korea, and Taiwan-this book explores the origins of political-economic institutions and the mechanisms connecting them to economic outcomes. David Waldner extends our understanding of the political underpinnings of economic development by examining the origins of political coalitions on which states and their institutions depend. He first provides a political model of institutional change to analyze how elites build either cross-class or narrow coalitions, and he examines how these arrangements shape specific institutions: state-society relations, the nature of bureaucracy, fiscal structures, and patterns of economic intervention. He then links these institutions to economic outcomes through a bargaining model to explain why countries such as Korea and Taiwan have more effectively overcome the collective dilemmas that plague economic development than have others such as Turkey and Syria. The latter countries, he shows, lack institutional solutions to the problems that surround productivity growth. The first book to compare political and economic development in these two regions, State Building and Late Development draws on, and contributes to, arguments from political sociology and political economy. Based on a rigorous research design, the work offers both a finely drawn comparison of development and a compellingly argued analysis of the character and consequences of "precocious Keynesianism," the implementation of Keynesian demand-stimulus policies in largely pre-industrial economies
9781501717338 (electronic bk.) 1501717332 (electronic bk.)
22573/ctv1krvrz JSTOR
State, The.
État.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Political Economy.
Politics and government
State, The.
Politik
Staatsvorming.
Syria--Politics and government.
Turkey--Politics and government.
Korea--Politics and government.
Taiwan--Politics and government.
Syrie--Politique et gouvernement.
Turquie--Politique et gouvernement.
Corée--Politique et gouvernement.
Taiwan--Politique et gouvernement.
Empire ottoman--Politique et gouvernement.
Korea.
Syria.
Taiwan.
Turkey.
Syrien
Türkei
Taiwan
Korea
Electronic books.
JC131 / .W36 1999eb
321/.09172/40904