Aristotle's Ethics and Moral Responsibility.
Echeñique, Javier.
Aristotle's Ethics and Moral Responsibility. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012. - 1 online resource (220 pages)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Cover; ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations of Aristotle's texts; Introduction; A. REPUTABLE OPINIONS; B. CONDITIONS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION AND THE NEGATIVE METHOD; C. DEFEATERS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION; PART I Towards an account of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 1 Against the Strawsonian interpretation; A. VOLUNTARINESS, PRAISE AND BLAME; B. THE STRAWSON-INSPIRED INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE; [I] Aristotelian praise and blame as S-reactive attitudes; [II] Aristotelian recipients of praise and blame as accountable agents. [III] Aristotelian praise and blame as non-prospective attitudesC. SETTING THE STAGE; D. PRAISE AND BLAME AS INVOLVED IN MORAL EDUCATION; E. MORALITY OF CHARACTER TRAITS; F. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AS LOGOI; G. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL; H. ARGUMENT FROM SKILLS; CHAPTER 2 Aristotle on ethical ascription; A. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ATTRIBUTABILITY; B. PUBLIC BLAME AND ARISTOTLES OWN VERSION OF ATTRIBUTABILITY; C. QUESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLES CONCERN WITH VOLUNTARINESS: FOCAL AND DERIVATIVE PRAISE AND BLAME; D. APT OBSERVER STANCE; E. REASON-RESPONSIVENESS. F. CONCLUDING REMARKSPART II TThe defeaters of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 3 THE DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE; A. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON VIOLENCE; B. PAIN AND THE CONTRARIETY CONDITION; C. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM; D. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE PAIN PROBLEM; E. SOLVING THE PAIN PROBLEM: MORAL PAIN AND CONTRARIETY TO REASON; F. CORE DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE; G. PROBLEM OF HOMONYMY; H. GORGIAS' CHALLENGE; CHAPTER 4 Coercion as justification and excuse I: the Ethica Eudemia; A. NON-SUBSTANTIVE COERCION AND ITS TWO VARIETIES; B. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION. C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCIOND. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND WHAT DEPENDS ON ONE; CHAPTER 5 Coercion as justification and excuse II: the Ethica Nicomachea; A. ETHICA NICOMACHEA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION; B. PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENCE; C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND MATRICIDE; CHAPTER 6 Factual error and the source of blame; A. GENERAL ACCOUNT OF FACTUAL UNAWARENESS; B. ACTION-DESCRIPTIONS AND THE PRIMACY CLAIM; C. CULPABLE ERROR; D. ETHICA EUDEMIA II 9; E. ETHICA NICOMACHEA III 1 AND 5; F. CONCLUDING REMARKS; CHAPTER 7 The pain condition. A. PAIN CONDITION AND THE INVOLUNTARYB. REFINING OUR ACCOUNT OF THE PAIN CONDITION; C. MORAL PLEASURE AND PAIN; D. ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL AVERSION- AND COMPLIANCE-ATTITUDES; E. THE COMPATIBILITY TEST; Conclusion; APPENDIX Two lexical ambiguities in Aristotles use of 'to eph' hautô[i]'; Bibliography; Index.
Echeñique discusses Aristotle's views on moral agency and voluntariness and presents a theory of moral responsibility both original and compelling.
English.
9781139422109 1139422103 9781139424141 (electronic bk.) 1139424149 (electronic bk.) 9781139109420 (electronic bk.) 1139109421 (electronic bk.) 1139411683 9781139411684 1107231590 9781107231597 1280683090 9781280683091 9786613660039 6613660035 1139420054 9781139420051 1139418017 9781139418010 9781107499652 (paperback) 1107499658
9786613660039
366003 MIL
Aristotle. English. Nicomachean ethics.
Nicomachean ethics (Aristotle)
Ethics, Ancient.
Morale ancienne.
PHILOSOPHY--History & Surveys--Ancient & Classical.
PHILOSOPHY--Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Ethics, Ancient.
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
B491.E7 / E24 2012eb
170.92
Aristotle's Ethics and Moral Responsibility. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012. - 1 online resource (220 pages)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Cover; ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations of Aristotle's texts; Introduction; A. REPUTABLE OPINIONS; B. CONDITIONS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION AND THE NEGATIVE METHOD; C. DEFEATERS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION; PART I Towards an account of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 1 Against the Strawsonian interpretation; A. VOLUNTARINESS, PRAISE AND BLAME; B. THE STRAWSON-INSPIRED INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE; [I] Aristotelian praise and blame as S-reactive attitudes; [II] Aristotelian recipients of praise and blame as accountable agents. [III] Aristotelian praise and blame as non-prospective attitudesC. SETTING THE STAGE; D. PRAISE AND BLAME AS INVOLVED IN MORAL EDUCATION; E. MORALITY OF CHARACTER TRAITS; F. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AS LOGOI; G. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL; H. ARGUMENT FROM SKILLS; CHAPTER 2 Aristotle on ethical ascription; A. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ATTRIBUTABILITY; B. PUBLIC BLAME AND ARISTOTLES OWN VERSION OF ATTRIBUTABILITY; C. QUESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLES CONCERN WITH VOLUNTARINESS: FOCAL AND DERIVATIVE PRAISE AND BLAME; D. APT OBSERVER STANCE; E. REASON-RESPONSIVENESS. F. CONCLUDING REMARKSPART II TThe defeaters of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 3 THE DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE; A. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON VIOLENCE; B. PAIN AND THE CONTRARIETY CONDITION; C. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM; D. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE PAIN PROBLEM; E. SOLVING THE PAIN PROBLEM: MORAL PAIN AND CONTRARIETY TO REASON; F. CORE DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE; G. PROBLEM OF HOMONYMY; H. GORGIAS' CHALLENGE; CHAPTER 4 Coercion as justification and excuse I: the Ethica Eudemia; A. NON-SUBSTANTIVE COERCION AND ITS TWO VARIETIES; B. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION. C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCIOND. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND WHAT DEPENDS ON ONE; CHAPTER 5 Coercion as justification and excuse II: the Ethica Nicomachea; A. ETHICA NICOMACHEA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION; B. PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENCE; C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND MATRICIDE; CHAPTER 6 Factual error and the source of blame; A. GENERAL ACCOUNT OF FACTUAL UNAWARENESS; B. ACTION-DESCRIPTIONS AND THE PRIMACY CLAIM; C. CULPABLE ERROR; D. ETHICA EUDEMIA II 9; E. ETHICA NICOMACHEA III 1 AND 5; F. CONCLUDING REMARKS; CHAPTER 7 The pain condition. A. PAIN CONDITION AND THE INVOLUNTARYB. REFINING OUR ACCOUNT OF THE PAIN CONDITION; C. MORAL PLEASURE AND PAIN; D. ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL AVERSION- AND COMPLIANCE-ATTITUDES; E. THE COMPATIBILITY TEST; Conclusion; APPENDIX Two lexical ambiguities in Aristotles use of 'to eph' hautô[i]'; Bibliography; Index.
Echeñique discusses Aristotle's views on moral agency and voluntariness and presents a theory of moral responsibility both original and compelling.
English.
9781139422109 1139422103 9781139424141 (electronic bk.) 1139424149 (electronic bk.) 9781139109420 (electronic bk.) 1139109421 (electronic bk.) 1139411683 9781139411684 1107231590 9781107231597 1280683090 9781280683091 9786613660039 6613660035 1139420054 9781139420051 1139418017 9781139418010 9781107499652 (paperback) 1107499658
9786613660039
366003 MIL
Aristotle. English. Nicomachean ethics.
Nicomachean ethics (Aristotle)
Ethics, Ancient.
Morale ancienne.
PHILOSOPHY--History & Surveys--Ancient & Classical.
PHILOSOPHY--Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Ethics, Ancient.
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
B491.E7 / E24 2012eb
170.92