Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the economics of recovery / Elliot A. Rosen.

By:

Rosen, Elliot A, 1928- [author.]

Material type: Text

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780813934273
0813934273
0813923689
9780813923680
1283805952
9781283805957

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the economics of recovery.DDC classification:

330.973/0917 22

LOC classification:

HC106.3 .R597 2005eb

Other classification:

15.85
q 70.1
NQ 5340

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

International financial crisis -- Nationalizing the economy -- Dollar devaluation and the monetary group -- Monetary policy and the Hoover-Strawn Group -- Fiscal policy and regional diversity -- The myth of a corporate state -- The limits of planning -- Trade reciprocity or the land used as concealed dole -- Relief, public works, and social insurance -- The new economics -- The national resources planning board -- Mature capitalism and developmental economics -- The economics of recovery.

Review: "Historians have often speculated on the alternative paths the United States might have taken during the Great Depression: What if Franklin D. Roosevelt had been killed by one of Giuseppe Zangara's bullets in Miami on February 15, 1933? Would there have been a New Deal under an administration led by Herbert Hoover had he been reelected in 1932? To what degree were Roosevelt's own ideas and inclinations, as opposed to those of his contemporaries, essential to the formulation of New Deal policies?"Summary: "In Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery, Elliot A. Rosen examines these and other questions, exploring the causes of the Great Depression and America's recovery from it in relation to the policies and policy alternatives that were in play during the New Deal era. Evaluating policies in economic terms, and disentangling economic claims from political ideology, Rosen argues that while planning efforts and full-employment policies were essential for coping with the emergency of the depression, from an economic standpoint it is in fact fortunate that they did not become permanent elements of our political economySummary: By insisting that the economic bases of proposals be accurately represented in debating their merits, Rosen reveals that the productivity gains, which accelerated in the years following the 1929 stock market crash, were more responsible for long-term economic recovery than were governmental policies."--Jacket

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Includes bibliographical references (pages 241-284) and index.

"Historians have often speculated on the alternative paths the United States might have taken during the Great Depression: What if Franklin D. Roosevelt had been killed by one of Giuseppe Zangara's bullets in Miami on February 15, 1933? Would there have been a New Deal under an administration led by Herbert Hoover had he been reelected in 1932? To what degree were Roosevelt's own ideas and inclinations, as opposed to those of his contemporaries, essential to the formulation of New Deal policies?"

"In Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery, Elliot A. Rosen examines these and other questions, exploring the causes of the Great Depression and America's recovery from it in relation to the policies and policy alternatives that were in play during the New Deal era. Evaluating policies in economic terms, and disentangling economic claims from political ideology, Rosen argues that while planning efforts and full-employment policies were essential for coping with the emergency of the depression, from an economic standpoint it is in fact fortunate that they did not become permanent elements of our political economy

By insisting that the economic bases of proposals be accurately represented in debating their merits, Rosen reveals that the productivity gains, which accelerated in the years following the 1929 stock market crash, were more responsible for long-term economic recovery than were governmental policies."--Jacket