Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? / Timothy Lane, Steven Phillips.

By:

Lane, Timothy D. (Timothy David), 1955- [author.]

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.Publisher: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2002Copyright date: ©2002Description: 1 online resource (v, 15 pages) : illustrationsContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781451935219
1451935218
1462318975
9781462318971
1452700923
9781452700922
1455294314
9781455294312
145270192X
9781452701929

Other title:

Does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Electronic books.

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Moral hazard.DDC classification:

338.91 22

LOC classification:

HC60 .L311 2002eb

Other classification:

83.44

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Action note:

digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve

Summary: "The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface.

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"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii.

Print version record.

"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface.

Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL

Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL

Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL

http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212

Available also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish.

digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL

Includes bibliographical references.

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