The great powers and the international system : systemic theory in empirical perspective / Bear F. Braumoeller, Ohio State University.

Preface; 1 Introduction; The agent -- structure debate; The nature of structure; Ameliorating the dilemma: reciprocity; Systemic traditions; Nested politics; The argument, in brief; Advantages; Plan of the book; 2 System, state, and citizen; Introduction; Systems: general principles; Rational expectations; Complexity vs. parsimony; Components of the theory; Citizen; State; System; The theory; Hypotheses; Actor-level hypothesis; Structural hypothesis; Systemic hypotheses; Implications for other theories; Offensive and defensive realism; Trading states and balances of power.

The logic of hegemony Constructivism and socialization; Second-order effects; Conclusion; 3 System, process, and evidence; The European system; 1815 -- 1914; 1919 -- 1939; 1945 -- 1993; Who are the actors?; Data; Capabilities and arms levels: the correlates of war; The balance of ideology: polity; Worldviews and levels of activity: the historians' survey; Interrogating the data; Estimation; Results; Rational expectations; Visualizing systemic incentives; Diagnostic checks; Domestic constraint; Are there more than three systems?; Conclusion; 4 Systems in historic perspective.

Case 1: the polarization of Europe, 1815-834; The Vienna settlement; The liberalization of Britain; The growing liberal challenge; The early 1830s: revolution and schism; Summary; Case 2: the end of American isolation, 1940; The legacy of Versailles; Nazi ideology; German weakness; Initial American indifference; Structural change: Germany's rise; End of isolation; Summary; Case 3: the end of the Cold War, 1985 -- 1990; Introduction; Background; Changing constituencies; The trigger: changing Soviet worldviews; Reaction: red tide's ebb; Partial adjustment: American prudence; Summary; Conclusion.

5 Conclusions and implications into the future?; Sovereignty, terror, proliferation, and deterrence; The rise of China; Democracy; System effects; Systems and forecasts; What is to be done?; Systems and international relations; Appendix A: Theoretical details; The model; Relaxing the unidimensionality assumption; Sympathetic vs. antagonistic states; Analytical results; Realism implies a balance of power; Defensive realism also implies a balance of power; A balance of power does not imply realism; Socialization implies a balance of power; Appendix B: Empirical details.

Nested politics and structural change Derivation; Detailed results; Bibliography; Index.

"This is the first book to describe and test a fully systemic theory of international politics. Using statistics and diplomatic history, it traces statesmen's efforts to influence the power and ideas that form the broad contours of the international system within which they interact"-- Provided by publisher.

"In Thucudides' History of the Peloponnesian War, the author recounts an incident in which the Athenians sailed to the island of Melos, a Spartan colony, and two Athenian Generals, Cleomedes and Tisias, sent their representatives to negotiate with the Council of the Melians. What makes their dialogue especially noteworthy is the Athenians' bald statement at the onset that, in their negotiations, the Melians should not appeal to the Athenians' sense of justice, because, quite simply, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." The sphere of power is independent of the sphere of justice, rendering the state an autonomous actor, able to pursue its own interests, limited only by its own capabilities. Millenia later, in an era in which Great Powers have given way to superpowers and nuclear weapons have magnified the disparity between strong and weak to a degree unimaginable to the Athenians, the aphorism remains familiar and seems more applicable than ever. It is surprising, therefore, to find some of the most adroit statesmen at the helm of some of the most powerful states of the past two centuries expressing near-helplessness in the face of the impersonal forces that shape world politics. No less effective a diplomat than Charles de Talleyrand-Périgord famously said that "[t]he art of statesmanship is to foresee the inevitable and to expedite its occurrence." Otto von Bismarck, architect of German unification, wrote that "[e]ven victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a nation." Such quotes, indicating as they do that even Great Powers often have very little freedom of action amid the overwhelming pull of international events, seem puzzling coming from statesmen famous for their ability to produce the outcomes they desired"-- Provided by publisher.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 243-267) and index.

Print version record.

English.

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