The economic vote : how political and economic institutions condition election results / Raymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 373-390) and index.

Defining and measuring the economic vote -- Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies -- Estimation, measurement and specification -- Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting -- What do voters know about economic variation and its sources? -- Political control of the economy -- Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote -- The distribution of responsibility and economic vote -- The pattern of contention and the economic vote.

Print version record.

This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.

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