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Veto players [electronic resource] :how political institutions work / George Tsebelis.

By: Tsebelis, George.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: New York : Princeton : Russell Sage Foundation ; Princeton University Press, �2002Description: 1 online resource (xvii, 317 pages) : illustrations.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781400831456 (electronic bk.); 1400831458 (electronic bk.).Subject(s): Comparative government | Political planning | Political science -- Decision making | Legislation | Legislation -- European Union countries | Legislation -- European Union countries | Political Science | POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Government -- Comparative | POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Reference | POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Process -- General | Comparative government | Legislation | Political planning | Political science -- Decision making | Europe -- European Union countriesGenre/Form: Electronic books.DDC classification: 320.3 Online resources: EBSCOhost
Contents:
Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; Introduction; PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY; PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS; PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS; PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.
Summary: Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-308) and index.

Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface and Acknowledgments; Introduction; PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY; PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS; PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS; PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political.

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