A revolution in military adaptation : the US Army in the Iraq War / Chad C. Serena.

By:

Serena, Chad C

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Book collections on Project MUSE | UPCC book collections on Project MUSE. Political Science and Policy Studies.Publication details: Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2011.Description: 1 online resource (xvi, 206 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781589018006
1589018001
1589017838
9781589017832

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Revolution in military adaptation.DDC classification:

956.7044/340973 22

LOC classification:

DS79.76 .R484 2011eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Decisions in the post-Cold War period -- The transformation of the U.S. Army -- The invasion of Iraq and compelled adaptation -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational inputs -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational outputs and learning -- The U.S. Army and the post-9/11 international security environment in perspective.

Summary: During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A.

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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US A.

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