Voting and collective decision-making : bargaining and power / Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano.

By:

Laruelle, Annick [author.]

Contributor(s):

Valenciano, Federico [author.]

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.Description: 1 online resource (xvii, 184 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

0511429541
9780511429545
9780511429927
0511429924
9780511429132
0511429134
9780511493553
051149355X
9780521182638
0521182638

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Voting and collective decision-making.DDC classification:

324.601 22

LOC classification:

HD30.23 .L374 2008eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

1. Preliminaries -- 2. Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities -- 3. 'Take-it-or-leave-it' committees -- 4. Bargaining committees -- 5. Application to the European Union.

Summary: Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

1. Preliminaries -- 2. Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities -- 3. 'Take-it-or-leave-it' committees -- 4. Bargaining committees -- 5. Application to the European Union.

Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.

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