Property, Predation, and Protection : piranha capitalism in Russia and Ukraine / Stanislav Markus.

Print version record.

Cover; Half-title; Dedication; Title page; Copyright information; Table of contents; List of figures; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; The Magic of Secure Property Rights; Failed States, Dominant Rulers, and Credible Commitment: Conventional Wisdom; Threats to Property Rights; Securing Property Rights; Of State Piranhas and Business Stakeholders: Toward a New Theory; Methodology; Organization of the Book; 2 Agent Predation and Secure Ownership; Background and Definitions; Critique of the Literature; State Failure and Ruler Dominance as Threats?; State Commitment as Panacea?

Business Owners as Mere Policy-Takers?Agent Predation and the Bottom-Up Path to Secure Ownership; Ideal Types of State Threats to PR; Varieties of Agent Predation; State Actors and Agent Predation; From Agent Predation to Property Protection: Three Arguments; Property Rights and Postcommunism; Appendix: Interviews and Survey; Interviews; Survey; 3 Not Too Petty; Private Ownership and Its Legal Protections: A Brief History; Agent Predation beyond "Corruption"; Annexation; Intervention and Extortion; Administrative Wars and Agent Predation; Russia and Ukraine Compared; Private Threats.

Survey Evidence: Agent Predation or Siphoning?Income Threats and Ownership Threats Compared; Impact of Distinct Threat Types; Dynamic Trends and the Broader Postcommunist Region; 4 Mini-Beasts versus Sovereign; Expert Opinion and Bureaucrat behavior; Sovereign Priorities and Agent Predation; Power Retention; Military Security; State Budgets and Pet Projects; Sovereign Efforts to Contain Agent Predation; Administrative Reform; Manual Control; Anti-Raiding Reforms and Sovereign Intentions; Deregulation and Sovereign Intentions; Survey Evidence: Agent Predation or Principal Expropriation?

Blame Attribution and Remedies for PR Insecurity: Central Vs Local StateImpact of Central-Local Blame Attribution on Firm Behavior; Subnational Variation in State Threats; Conclusion: Bespredel, Samodeiatel'nost', and History; 5 Commitment Dissolved; Putin's Russia and the Rise of The Business Quartet; Business Institutionalization under Putin; The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; The Chamber of Commerce and Industry; The Union of Business Associations of Russia (OPORA); Business Russia (Delovaia Rossiia); The BA Quartet.

The Logic of Business Institutionalization: Cooptation versus CommitmentBusiness Institutionalization for Vote Harvesting?; Business Institutionalization for Sovereign Domination of Firms?; Business Institutionalization as Commitment; The Limits of "Commitment"; Subversion by State Agents; Politicization of Business Associations; Ukraine's Orange Revolution and Property Rights; Constraints on the Ukrainian Presidency before and after the Revolution; Whither Sovereign Commitment?; Predation in Orange; Impunity and Instability; Incompetence; Re-privatization; Conclusion.

6 Firm Stakeholders versus State Predators.

This book analyzes the threats to the property rights of business owners and investigates what makes these rights secure.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

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