International relations under risk : framing state choice / Jeffrey D. Berejikian.
Material type: TextSeries: SUNY series in global politicsPublication details: Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2004.Description: 1 online resource (xiv, 151 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780791485484
- 079148548X
- Protocole de Montréal sur les substances appauvrissant la couche d'ozone
- International relations -- Psychological aspects
- International relations -- Decision making
- Relations internationales -- Prise de décision
- Relations internationales -- Aspect psychologique
- POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Globalization
- International relations -- Decision making
- International relations -- Psychological aspects
- Internationale Politik
- Entscheidungsfindung
- Aspect psychologique
- Politique internationale
- Prise de décision
- Psychologie cognitive
- Relations internationales
- Théorie du choix rationnel
- "Multi-User"
- 327.1/01/9 22
- JZ1253 .B47 2004
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 133-143) and index.
Print version record.
International Relations under Risk: Framing State Choice -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- 1. Competing Models of Decision Making -- INTRODUCTION -- COGNITION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY -- PROSPECT THEORY -- ASSESSMENT -- CHAPTER SUMMARY -- 2. Prospect Theory andInternational Relations -- INTRODUCTION -- ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROSPECT THEORY -- PROSPECT THEORY AND THE STUDYOF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -- CONCLUSION -- 3. The Use of Power -- INTRODUCTION -- STATUS QUO, SUBJECTIVITY, AND DECISION FRAMES -- POWER AND COERCION
MILITARY DETERRENCEECONOMIC THREATS -- TWO-LEVEL ECONOMIC THREAT MODEL -- THE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS -- CONCLUSION -- 4. Cooperation -- INTRODUCTION -- PROPOSITIONS ON NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION -- COOPERATION AND THE PRISONER�S DILEMMA -- IS COOPERATION RISKY OR SAFE? -- STRATEGIC CHOICE -- COOPERATION AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS -- CONCLUSION -- 5. A Unified Theoryof Preferences -- INTRODUCTION -- THE GAINS DEBATE -- THE PROBLEM OF FIXED PREFERENCES -- CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE GAINS DEBATE -- UNIFYING PREFERENCES
POWER, PREFERENCES, AND STRATEGIESCONCLUSION -- 6. The European Community -- BACKGROUND -- FOREIGN POLICY IN A COMMUNITY -- THE DECISION FRAME PRIOR TO VIENNA -- NEGOTIATING AT VIENNA: 1982�1985 -- RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE GAINS? -- THE FORMATION OF A LOSSES FRAME -- THE EUROPEAN GAMBLE -- CONCLUSION -- 7. The United States -- BACKGROUND -- BANNING CFCS PRIOR TO A DECISION FRAME -- AMERICAN PASSIVITY -- THE ALLIANCE FOR CFCS -- AN INADVERTENT LOSSES FRAME -- THE MOVE TO MULTILATERALISM:VIENNA AND MONTREAL -- CONCLUSION -- 8. Conclusions
PREFERENCES AND FRAMESREALISM AND COOPERATION -- RISK ACCEPTANCE, COOPERATION, AND REGIME DESIGN -- POWER, LEVERAGE, AND DOMESTIC WIN-SETS -- THE “OZONE HOLE� -- THE PROMISE OF A COGNITIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM -- Notes -- References -- List of Titles in the SUNY series in Global Politics -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W
"The field of international relations is only now beginning to take notice of cognitive models of decision making. Arguing against the trend of adopting formalistic depictions of human choice, Berejikian suggests that international relations and realistic models of human decision making go hand-in-hand. The result is a set of interconnected propositions that provide new insights into state behavior. Utilizing this framework, he discusses the behavior of the United States and Europe in negotiating the Montreal Protocol, a landmark international agreement designed to save the earth's protective ozone shield."--Jacket.
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